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Book Review:
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE
Jerry L. Mashaw
Yale University Press
1983
The latest book by Professor Jerry L. Mashaw was written, he says, to
satisfy two personal curiosities. The first stated objective is to test the validity
of criticisms voiced by Social Security Administrative Law Judges to case management
and case development. He couches the second inquiry in the following language: "Is
it possible to integrate the normative concerns of administrative law with the
positive concerns of organizational theory?"
This second question establishes the tone of the book, which is, primarily,
an elaboration of Professor Mashaw's philosophy of administrative law, as applied to
the Social Security Administration hearing process. Although subtitled "Managing
Social Security Disability Claims," Bureaucratic Justice is more likely to be studied
by academic lawyers and theoreticians than by judges or program managers.
The argument constructed by Professor Mashaw is too complex to be fairly
summarized here. Even if space permitted, this reviewer (who is not a theoretician)
would be ill-suited to analyze a work of abstract jurisprudential theory. Absent a
fair statement of Professor Mashaw's position, any criticism of his views necessarily
lacks persuasive force. Accordingly, this discussion will be confined to the general
observations of an administrative law judge, whose outlook, admittedly, is very
different from that of Professor Mashaw.l
To a lawyer trained in the adversarial system, with its reasonably clear
division of responsibility between plaintiff and defendant, judge and jury, the
position of a Social Security Judge seems anomalous, at best. The Judge works for,
but is independent from, the Social Security Administration. He is the first agency
employee to see the claimant face to face. The claimant appears at a hearing, some-
times with counsel, to establish his entitlement to benefits, previously denied him
by the agency. Except on a limited, experimental basis, no one appears at the hearing
on behalf of the Social Security Administration to support the denial, and the agency's
position, on both the law and the facts, must be inferred from the documents alone.
The Social Security Judge must act as judge, jury, and prosecutor, and, where the
claimant is unrepresented (or under-represented) as defense counsel as well.
This system has been criticized, by Social Security Judges and others, on
the grounds that the Judge's impartiality, and the appearance thereof, is necessarily
compromised. The dual role of the Judge (as arbiter of fact and advocate for
I It is a fair measure of the reviewer's bias that he generally agrees with the
thesis advanced by Dean Monroe H. Freedman in Lawyer's Ethics in an Adversary
System (Bobbs-Merrill, 1975) and believes it applicable to administrative hearings.
The thesis is often seen as advocating an unfettered adversary system.
denial 2 ) and his relationship to the agency itself, are the focal points of most
criticism. These arguments have never been answered to the satisfaction of the
critics, and, in the opinion of this reviewer, are not adequately answered in
Professor Mashaw's book.
Since the system of Social Security adjudication cannot be completely
justified within the traditional theoretical framework of a totally impartial Judge,
acting in the context of an adversary proceeding, the system must be defended on other
grounds. Arguments range from "We've always done it this way and it works" to the
need to maximize the effect of lawful policy directives on the ultimate work product
of the agency. The principal justifications most frequently used, however, are, in the
final analysis, simply variations on the argument of efficiency and expediency.
Bureaucratic Justice reflects an apparent effort to organize the traditional
defenses of Social Security adjudication into a logical system grounded in legal
theory: in short, a philosophical and legal explanation for the status quo. It is an
ambitious project of which more qualified individuals will judge the success. This
reviewer is unpersuaded.
Professor Mashaw avers that he chose the Social Security Administration as
the basis for his argument principally because it is the agency with which he is
most familiar. Neither his expertise on Social Security matters, nor the importance
of Social Security adjudication within the framework of Federal administrative law, can
be doubted. Nevertheless, the controversial experience of a single, somewhat unique
adjudicatory agency seems an inadequate basis for the book's more general conclusions.
Judges familiar with formal adversarial administrative trials may well derive from
their own experience a philosophy of law more consistent with traditional views of
due process trial - a philosophy in which bureaucracy is the servant of justice
rather than its partner, master, or alter ego.
2 Of course, those who adhere to the position that Social Security hearings, in
theory and in practice, are "non-adversial" would deny that the Judge is an
advocate for any point of view.
BOOK REVIEW:
Causes of Action
Shepard' s/McGraw-H I 11
P.O. Box 1235
Colorado Springs, CO 80901
Of considerable interest to practicing attorneys is a new series by
Shepard's/McGraw-Hill entitled Causes of Action. The series has potential value
for administrative practitioners, including administrative law judges.
Causes of Action (cited by the publisher as "COA") is comprised of original
articles, fifty to one hundred pages in length, addressed to legal issues of current
practical importance. Each article contains a broad outline of the subject, with
specific reference to the decisional law of the various states and the Federal courts.
Annexed to each article is the text of a sample case. In concept, therefore, COA
is strongly reminiscent of West's American Law Reports.
Unlike ALR, however, COA has a distinctly practical orientation. For
example, the article "Cause of action by 'at will' employee for wrongful discharge,"
I COA 273, begins with a statement of the available actions (tort or contract), the
elements of a prima facie case under each theory, the identity of the persons liable
(the employer, and in certain circumstances, fellow employees) and the damages
recoverable - all compressed into two hundred words. The text of the article
(which follows a table of contents and descriptive word index) is divided into an
introduction (Sec. I Scope, Sec. 2 Alternate Legal Actions), a substantive law over-
view (in which contract and tort actions are treated seriatim, describing for each cause
of action the legal background, the requisite proof, and the available defenses), a
practice and procedure section, and an appendix (consisting of the sample case, a sample
pleading, and a research guide). The article concludes with a table of cases.
The wrongful discharge article does not contain footnotes. Rather, important
collateral and developmental points are treated in extremely useful "Practice Guides"
liberally interspersed with the text.
As might be expected, the article contains numerous cross-references and
other research aids. Its organization is typical of the ten articles which comprise
the first volume of COA.
COA is not limited to judicial causes of action. An article "Recovery
under Workers' Compensation statute for mental disorder caused by work connected stress
without physical cause or result," I COA 75, undertakes to treat, with appropriate
cautions, both the substantive law and the important procedural issues which arise
under the divergent provisions of state administrative practice. Other articles
touch upon products liability (brake defects and pharmaceuticals), psychiatric
malpractice, false arrest of suspected shoplifters, refusal of insurers to negotiate
in good faith, tax refund cases, discrimination in lending, and a cause of action
under 15 USC 1988, 1989, which requires sellers of motor vehicles to provide the
purchaser with information concerning the vehicle's actual mileage.
Where a cause of action has its basis in a statute, the text of the statute,
and the relevant administrative regulations are reprinted in the article itself in
order to expedite research. The series has other helpful features, including reprints
from Shepard's Citators.
It would be unfair to compare COA to the highly regarded first series of
American Law Reports. Deep scholarship and long reflection are increasingly rare
in the competitive world of commercial legal printing. If C0A is more encyclopedic
than profound, it is generally well written, and far more readable than some of its
modern counterparts. Its practical approach is, in the view of this reader, success-
ful. These virtues, when coupled with the appropriate selection of topics included
in the first volume, make COA a series well worth examining.
Past President Paul Wlyler of California has brought to the attention of the Journal
the case of Norman v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 83 Daily Journal D.A.R.
1516, dec. June 6, 1983. The California Supreme Court held that the voluntary termina-
tion of one's employment in order to follow a nonmarital "loved one" (the plaintiff's
live-in boyfriend) to another location does not constitute "good cause" for purposes
of determining eligibility to receive unemployment compensation benefits. Judge Wyler
reports that California's chances of falling into the ocean are not affected by this
decision.
